Cambodia: A Country Profile
Through the efforts of CMAC, Mines Advisory Group and HALO Trust, Cambodia is
working to eliminate the hundreds of contaminated areas within its borders.
Rohan Maxwell proposes changes in these operations to sustain removal efforts.
By Rohan Maxwell, Officer, Canadian Army

million Cambodians died of starvation, disease and murder.
Approximately 5 percent of the mines were laid under the
Background
Khmer Rouge regime, mainly in the Thai and Vietnamese
border regions.
n the late I960s, communist insurgems known as the
The second civil war began at the end of 1978 when
Khmer Rouge began operations against the central Vietnam, goaded by border provocations, drove its erstwhile
government of Cambodia, launching three decades of ally back into guerilla warfare and installed a more
nearly continuous warfare. Vietnamese communists cooperative government led by Khmer Rouge defectors.
supported the insurgents, while the government came to After a decade of fighting between the cenrral government
be supported by the United States and South Vietnam. (and its Vietnamese backers) and the Khmer Rouge (and
The fighting was exacerbated by the expansion of the various non-communist Cambodian groups formerly
Vietnam War into eastern Cambodia, including a massive opposed to them), Vietnam withdrew its forces and peace
American bombing campaign against communist supply negotiations began. With the concurrence of all parties,
lines. Battlefield UXO was widely dispersed, while aerial- the U.N. Transitional Amhority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
delivered UXO was concentrated in the eastern and central was mandated to run Cambodia for I8 months (1992provinces (ref 1). According to the International 1993) in order to supervise demobilization and conduct
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (ref 2), about IO elections. The Khmer Rouge chose to resume fighting, so
percent of the mines in Cambodia were laid during this demobilization failed, bur elections did rake place and the
period-most in the central and southern provinces.
central government gained greater international legitimacy.
The first civil war ended with the defeat of the central The war continued for the remainder of the 1990s, with
government in Apriii975. It was followed by 44 horrific the central government slowly gaining the upper hand and
months of Khmer Rouge rule, during which more than I internal and external support for the guerillas ebbed. Most
of the fighting took place in the northern and northwestern
provinces, bm there was also significant fighting in the
central and southern provinces. By the late 1990s, the
guerillas were a spent force and the last groups gave up in
1999.
The majority of the mines, 85 percent, were laid
during rhe second civil war. All combatants used mines
extensively, and, ironically, the highly mine-affected
Cambodian civilians began using them for their own
purposes-self-defense, protection of property, or brutally
direct dispute resolution. Few records were kept, bur in
1994 the United Nations estimated that there were as many
as I 0 million mines in Cambodia (ref2). In I997, this was
reduced to 4 million to 6 million (ref 2), an estimate
supported by the number of mines that were actually being
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A bridge along National Route 10, the main highway
connecting Cambodia's second-largest city, Battambang, to
Thailand. c/o Rohan Maxwell

located (ref 3). In 1999, the HALO
Trust rook this empirical approach one
step further, applying the known
clearance results to the amount ofland
thought to still be contaminated: this
estimate suggested that there had been
no more than 1 million mines to begin
with (ref2).
UNTAC identified more than
I ,900 potentially contaminated areas
(ref 3) totaling approximately 3,600
square kilometers (refs 2 and 3). By
1999, subsequen t survey efforts had
reduced this to 2,800 sq. km (ref 3) .
O f this total, 656 sq. km were known
to be contaminated (ref 4), leaving
2, 144 sq. km in doubt. Since on
average only 35 percent of suspected
terrain is actually mined (ref 2), it is
probable that a further 750 sq. km of
contaminated land will be identified,
for a total of approximately 1,400 sq.
km. This total will require a significant
amount of clearance, since on average
each square kilometer ofcontaminated
land contains more than 1,000 mines.
In 1993, the UNTAC force
commander estimated that it would
take 30 to 40 years to demine
Cambodia (ref 5). In fact, given the
current clearance rate ofapproximately
15 sq. km per year (ref 2), it would
take 93 years to clear I ,400 sq. km. If
only high priority land is consideredland needed for resettlement,
agriculture and critical developmentthe task becomes more manageable.
For example, the HALO Trust
estimates that all high-priority land in
Cambodia could be cleared in five to
10 years at the current rate of progress
(ref 2). This estimate depends on the
definition of high-priority land, but
the key point is that with continued
international assistance it should be
possible for most Cambodians to live
a mine-free existence within a
reasonable period of time. Once that
has been accomplished, a smallerscale, long-term effort can deal with
the remaining areas.

The Mines

Of all mines in Cambodia, 99
percent are AP: 68 percent blast, 26
percent fragmentation, and 5 percent
bounding fragmentation. The Russian
PMN-2, whose 115-gram charges
inflict great damage, accounts for
approximately 80 percent of the blast
mines. Smaller blast mines include the
Vietnamese MD 82B and MN 79, the
Russian PMD-6 and the very low
metal content Chinese Type 72A and
B (the B model incorporates an antidisturbance device). Most fragmentation mines are Russian POMZ-2 or
POMZ-2Ms, while the Chinese Type
69 is the bounding fragmentation
mine of choice. AT mines are almost
all Russian; many of them are buried
in stacks of two or three more than a
meter down with a bamboo pole to
conduct pressure from the surface to
an AP mine placed atop the first AT
mine (refS 3 and 4).

analysis-at present a majority of the
estimated 49,846 Cambodian
amputees (ref 1) are casualties of mines
and UXO. As amputations represent
27 to 40 percent of all injuries (refs 5
and 8), there could have been as many
as 124,615 ro 183,281 casualties.
Discrepancies on such a large scale are

Casualties

In 1994, Handicap International
determined from the number of minerelated amputations per month that
there were approximately 500
casualties per month from 1985-1994,
or a total of 60,000 casualties (ref 5).
In contrast, a 1998 estimate by the
U.S. government gives a smaller figure
of 37,428 casualties for the longer
period of 1979 - 1996, including
13,328 fatalities (ref 1). The most
comprehensive and recent information
is that gathered by the Cambodian
Mine Incident Database. This source
provides a figure of 48,842 mine and
UXO casualties from 1979 to the
present (ref 8). Adding 15 percent for
pre-1979 casualties (based on the
proportion of mines laid before 1979)
increases this to perhaps 56,168
casualties since the fighting began, as
many as 28 percent of which may have
been fatal (15,727 deaths-refs 1 and
8). This is by no means a worst-case
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A mine detecting team

ready for the mine field.
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difficult to fathom until one recalls
that a much larger figure-the number
who died under the Khmer Rougehas not yet been narrowed down to
the nearest million.
The Mine Incident Database
provides excellent derail on the current
situation. At present, 91 percent of
casualties are civilians, 38 percent of
whom are injured in the course of
subsistence activities such as farming,
gathering wood, fishing, collecting
food, fetching water and herding
cattle. An additional 15 percent are
injured while travelling. Adult males

account for 63 percent of all victims,
bur 30 percent are children under the
age of 18. Tampering causes 42
percent of casualties, including onequarter of the men, three-quarters of
the children and one-quarter of the
women. Most of them fall victim to
mines, but UXO accounts for 41
percent of all casualties, including 69
percent of children . There are, on
average, 85 new victims each month ,
and 1 in 5 do not survive their injuries.
Demining Organizations

There are many humanitarian
organizations that have conducted,
supported or are pres en tly
contributing to demining operations
in Cambodia (e.g. Norwegian People's
Aid (N PA), Handicap International
(HI), World Vision, CARE) but this
article will discuss only those that are
c urrently conducting operations:
HALO Trust, Mines Advisory G roup
(MAG) and the Cambodian Mine
Action Center (CMAC). HALO Trust
has been working in the northwestern
provinces of Banteay Meanchey and
Siem Reap since O crober 1991. Tts
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500 Cambodian staff are organized
in to 16 clearance teams working
predominantly in th e immedi ate
vicinity of villages-houses, schools,
water supplies, health facilities and
paddy fields. HALO 's C ambodia
op erations are funded by the
governments of the United Kingdom,
the United States, Finland, Ireland and
Japan, as well as the United Nations,
the E uropea n Union (EU) and private
donors in England and Japan. MAG
Cambodia starred work in 1992. Its
min e action ream s are presenrly
co ncentrated in the northern and
northwestern provinces ofPreah Vihar
and Battambang. Like the HALO
teams, they normally work in
proximity to villages. The 389
Cam bodi an staff (including 48
amputees and 46 woman deminers)
and nine expatriates are supported by
donors including the governments of
t he United Kingdom, the United
States and Austria, as well as the
Lutheran World Service and Church
World Services.
CMAC evolved from th e
UNTAC Mine C learance Training
Unit in 1993. After initial funding

Billboard depicting a cooperative project of CARE, the World Food Programme and CMAC. C/o Rohan Maxwell
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difficulti es, it expanded ro a strength
of 2,800 Cambodian staff and 50
expatriates. C MAC is a Cambodian
agency, but it relies almost entirely on
international donations and it is
administered as a project of the U.N.
Development Programme. Its annual
budget has peaked at approximately
$12 million (U.S.), plus numerous
donation s in kind from donors
including Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Japan , the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, the EU, the
United Kingdom and the United
States.
CMAC's approximate 60 demining platoons are organized and
d eployed in groups of four to six
plaroons plus supporting elements
(ambulance, radio, guards, etc.), with
three such groups making up a
D emining Unit (DU). This type of
organization m ea ns that CMAC
ca nnot deal readily with smaller tasks.
Some flexibility is provided by
community min e teams whose
mandate is to take on urgent tasks in
order to reduce casualties as quickly
as possible. Ideally, these teams clear
the most critical areas in a village and
mark the remaining mined areas un til
CMAC can mount a larger operation.
There is also a small development
demining unit that-has carried our a
number of high prio rity tasks with
funding directly from UNHCR.
CMAC also deploys EOD, mine
awareness and mine marking teams.
Froml993 to 2000, CMAC's
platoons cleared an average of 10 sq.
km per year. In mid-2000, three of the
four DUs were working in th e
no rthwe stern
provinces
of
Battambang and Banreay Meanchey
and the fourth was preparing to move
into northern Ca mbodi a. Unfo rtunately, CMAC had failed to
adequately address a multitude of
concerns about mismanagement and
corruption, despite increasing donor
press ure beginning in 1999. As a

result, funding became steadily scarcer
an d after sc raping by for several
months, CMAC ceased operations
and laid off the majority of its staff in
late 2000. This effectively removed
t hree- quart ers of the d em ining
resources in Cambodia. Currenrly, it
appears that CMAC will resume
o perations at some point in 2001 ,
once donor concerns have been fully
addressed and funding reinstated.
Mea nwhile, several co mmercial
demining companies are currently
seeking to benefit, in part, from
C MAC's failings and receive the
a uthority to begin demining
opera nons.
The Planning Process

In theory, d e mining efforts
should be preceded by a systematic
Level 1 Survey. Unfortunately, the
sec urity situation in Cambodia
precluded such a survey until the late
1990s, and as a result the mo st
comprehensive data was that collected
by UNTAC and refined by CMAC.
Planning was further complicated by
the fact that many of the most afflicted
areas were not accessible to demining
organizations for security reasons. This
meant that demining effo rts were
freq uently directed at areas that were
accessible, but nor necessarily high
priority. Now that security levels have
improved, the plann ing process is
slowly being refined. In concept, the
prov incial governments should se t
demining requirements and priorities.
W h ere appropriate, NGOs and
international organizations working in
the province must also be involved in
the planning process, as they normally
provide the resources needed to pur
the de mined land to best use. Demining agencies should provide technical
advice-what can be done, and when
it can be done-bur they should not
set priorities. This concept places
responsibility for land use where it
belongs. Cambodian political

st ru c ture at th e prov in c ial level
includes the provincial governor and
government, the subordinate district
chiefs, the commune chiefs of each
district and the village chiefs of each
commune. The Provincial Rural
Development com mittee reco m mending demining priorities to the
governor, bur the derailed work is
carried our by the Land Use Planning
Unit (LUPU). Each district has a
District Working Group (DWG )
which submits its demining requirements and priorities to the LUPU (and
then to the PRDC) based on input
from the commune chiefs (who have
in turn consulted their village chiefs).
The PRDC then coordinates with the
demining agencies ro match resources
to tasks, and the result should be a fully
coordinated demining and development plan.
This process is sti ll being
developed . The key is to ensure that
planners and staff at all levels develop
the re quired level of te chnical
expertise-for example, the use of
Geographical Information Systems
(GIS)-as well as m anageme n t,
organizational and planning skills. In
Cambodia, where the Khmer Rouge
did its best to eliminate those who
possessed such skills, planning and
organizational stru ctures are being
rebuilt very nearly from scratch, and
it will be some time before the concept
outlined above can be completely
implemented. Land riding must also
become mo re reliable if de mined land
is to be pur to its intended use. Finally,
accurate survey data is still required,
and to thi s end a national Level 1
Survey has finally been in itiated, with
funding from the Canadian government.
National coordination between
the demining age n cies was until
recen tly a CMAC responsibility.
However, the agencies did nor
normally work in proximity to each
other, and CMAC and the demining
NGOs normally conce ntrated on
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different types of tasks. There was little
call for coordination in the field and,
fo r planning purposes, MAG and
HALO worked closely with selected
communities and agencies, while the
task of working with the provincial
governments fell largely to CMAC. In
2000, as part of the response to the
CMAC crisis, a national demining
authority was created. The
Cambodian Mine Action Authority is
d eveloping policies to regulate rhe
operation of commercial demining
companies and to conduct quality
assurance checks on all demining
agencies. Its secretary general envisions
the commercial companies underraking mine clearance tasks unsuitable
•
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for humanitarian organizations. It is
anticipated that t he first such
operation will be officially licensed in
March.
Demining Operations

Manual demining is the primary
method in use in Cambodia. The
eq uipment is typical for the job
(tripwire feelers, vegetation cutters,
mine d etecto rs, prodders and
excavating tools, varying suites of
protective equipment), as are th e
phys ically and mentally arduous
conditions deminers face daily. Rates
of pay are high by Cambodian
standards: $ 160 a month for a
b eginner CMAC deminer, in a
country where the per capita monthly
income is about $23. These wages and
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the status associated with being a
deminer are more than sufficient to
overcome any concern about death or
injury, and there is no shortage of
volu nteers. There has been a steady
trickle of casual ties amon g the
demining and EOD teams, averaging
eight or nine a year since 1993, about
7 percent of which are fatal. The
variety of soil conditions across the
country- in particular, che large areas
in which the soil contains a high
natural metal content-presents a
significant challenge, which in
CMAC's case has been partially
addressed by deploying two different
mine detectors. Another challenge is
the high level of metal contamination
in many areas- not just o n old
battlefields, which can be expected to
contain a great many metal fragments,
but also on the sites of abandoned
villages chat are now being resettled.
Ten miniscule fragments per square
meter is nor uncommon, and even the
most experienced dem iner cannot
differentiate between the signal
produced by such a fragment and that
produced by a low me cal con tent
mme.
In addition to the manual
de miners, there are a number of
mechanical systems that are either in

service or under evaluation. These
systems fall into two categories: those
designed to accelerate the manual
demining process by removing
vegetation (and tripwires); and those
intended to demine on their own, with
the sup port of a small number of
manual deminers. Vegetation cutters
are well suited co the Cambodian
situation, where the removal of
vegetation and checking for tripwires
consumes up to 70 percent of the
deminers' time (ref 3). HALO Trust
has successfu lly deployed seven
tractor-mounted vegetation cutters in
support of its 16 clearance teams.
MAG is currently conducting trials on
the Pearson Tractor, a multi-functional
system that can be adapted to clear
vegetation, cut small trees, and
conduct area reduction and quality
assurance tasks. The Tempest is a
remote-controlled mini-flail, which is
also being eval uated by MAG for
vegetation clearance. This machine is
unusual in that it was built in
Cambodia by a British charity that
employs disabled Cambodians.
Finally, CMAC is testing Japanese
vegetation cutting systems that are
essentially tracked excavators with
brushcutters in place of the excavator
buckets.
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The mechanical vegetation cutters described above are either
operational or show promise; in
contrast, the two mechanical
demining systems that have been
evaluated (both by CMAC) have
enjoyed less success. The first is the
Sisu RA-140 flail, originally designed
to clear scatterable mines from hard
surfaces or standard mines from open
terrain. After extensive trials, it" has
been concluded that this system
cannot clear terrain to meet required
standards. Only about 80 percent of
the mines (at depths of 5 to 20 em)
are detonated or rendered inoperable,
and there is a significant risk that some
mines could be thrown our of the mine
field into previously safe areas. In
addition, the system lacks mobility.
The Finnish government, though,
remains willing to underwrite the costs
of d eploying and operating two
systems, so CMAC uses them as
vegetation cutters. They enjoy
reasonable success in this role ,
particularly against thick bamboo, but
they continue to encounter mobility
problems.
T he second system is RHINO, a
cracked vehicle equi pped with two
heavy counter-rotating drum s
mounted laterally, one above the other,
on the front of the chassis. This
adapted agricultural system is designed
to till the soil to a depth of 20 em,
crushing all mines and UXO between
the drums. At a weight of 48 tons
(without the 14 ton tiller unit
attached), it was very difficult to
deploy RHINO co task sites during
its trials. Cranes and flatbed trailers of
the required capacity are not easily
procured in rural Cambodia, and it
was sometimes necessary to make
roure improvements in order to move
the system. Once on site, the machine
worked reasonably well when
difficulties with depth maintenance
had been resolved. A small number of
manual deminers dealt with awkward

spo ts and provided a measure of
quality assurance.
After its initial evaluation,
RHINO did valuable work in support
of a multi-village rehabilitation project
under the aegis of CARE Cambodia.
The drums survived mine and UXO
deto nations, but on a number of
occasions AT mine detonations
rendered the system inoperable for
significant periods of time. Spare pans
were an ongoing concern, because
most of them had to be shipped from
Germany. Most critically, RHINO
was expensive co operate. This can be
more than made up by the savings in
manual demining costs, but only if the
system can be deployed in a series of
very large, open mine fields in close
proximity to each other. This was not
the case in Cambodia, and once the
fun ding provided by the German
government ran out, RHINO
returned co Germany.
Finally, CMAC is developing a
mine detecting dog (MDD) capability,
fu nded by the Swedish government.
The inrent is to use MDDs for area
reduction and possibly for quality
ass urance , but the training and
deployment process has been a lengthy
one. The project began in 1996, but
there was a significant initial setback
w h en Cambodian dogs taken to
Sweden for training proved unsuitable
for the task, necessitating a fresh start
using Swedish dogs trained in
Ca mbodia. These dogs and their
Cambodian handlers moved from
their training facility to Battambang
province in early 2000. The intent was
to familiarize the teams with the
terrain before starting area reduction
tasks in the spring of 2000, but this
took longer than anticipated and as of
mid-2000 there were no operational
teams.

Conclusion
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